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INTRODUCTION
The business judgment rule is a venerable protection for corporate
directors acting in good faith, ensconced in the common law and
sometimes codified by statute. There has been a continuing debate,
however, regarding the availability of the defense to corporate officers.
In the wake of the Great Recession, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) has brought numerous lawsuits in its role as
receiver of failed banks against former bank directors and officers. The
FDIC has mounted a sustained attack on the availability of the business
judgment defense to bank officers in recent years, arguing—with mixed
success—that the business judgment rule does not apply to them.
This article discusses the FDIC’s approach to receivership litigation
over the past five years, explores the background of the business
judgment rule, evaluates whether the exclusion of officers from the
scope of business judgment protection is consistent with the policies
underlying the doctrine, and examines the current jurisprudence in three
states—Georgia, California, and Florida—to illustrate the range of
protections afforded to the judgments of bank officers. It concludes by
examining some practical considerations to consider when asserting this
affirmative defense.
I. THE FDIC’S APPROACH TO RECEIVERSHIP LITIGATION AFTER THE
GREAT RECESSION
The global economic crisis that roiled the subprime markets in
2007 and spread through all credit markets in 2008 proved to be the
worst economic period in the United States since the Great Depression.
Liquidity virtually disappeared, causing the failure of numerous
financial institutions including Bear Stearns and IndyMac, and
prompting the Federal Reserve to take unprecedented actions to infuse
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liquidity into financial markets. At the peak of the crisis in September
2008, financial markets were rocked by the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the
downgrade of AIG, and the failure of Washington Mutual, which had
been the nation’s largest savings-and-loan. Unemployment rates soared,
rising from under 5% nationally in early 2008 to more than 10% by
October 2009. The stock market lost over half of its value,1 and housing
values plunged, leaving millions of homeowners under water, delinquent
on their mortgage payments, and facing foreclosure. Alan Greenspan,
the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, aptly described the
financial crisis in 2008 as a “once in a century credit tsunami.”2
Not surprisingly, the Great Recession devastated federally insured
financial institutions. From 2001 through 2007, there were twenty-five
bank failures in the United States—all but three of which occurred
before 2005—with total losses estimated at just under $945 million.3
From 2008 through the present, the number of bank failures skyrocketed
to 507, more than eighteen times the rate seen in the preceding sevenyear period.4 Total losses were estimated to exceed $85 billion.5 At the
peak of the bank failures in 2010, regulators shuttered 157 banks across
the nation—over fifty of them in Florida and Georgia alone.6 In
testimony given to the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit on May 26, 2011, Sheila C. Bair, Chairperson of
the FDIC, testified that the financial crisis that hit “in the fall of 2008”
was “the worst financial crisis since the 1930s” and that “few at the time
foresaw the extent of the emerging threat to our financial stability.”7 Or
as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke observed afterwards in

1. The Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged from its peak of 14,165 on October
9, 2007 to its trough of 6,926 just 18 months later.
2. The Financial Crisis and the Role of Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve).
3. FDIC Failures & Assistance Transactions, FDIC (Dec. 23, 2014, 4:00 PM),
https://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. FDIC Oversight: Examining and Evaluating the Role of the Regulator during
the Financial Crisis and Today, Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. 48, 57 (2011) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman,
FDIC).
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discussions with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “a ‘perfect
storm’ had occurred that regulators could not have anticipated.”8
In the aftermath of this economic cataclysm, the FDIC has
vigorously pursued officers and directors of failed financial institutions
as it seeks to minimize losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund (“DIF”).
Acting as a receiver for failed financial institutions, the FDIC succeeds
to all rights and privileges of a failed bank, including claims against
former directors and officers.9 To date, the FDIC has authorized lawsuits
in connection with nearly one-third of the Great Recession bank
failures.10 From January 1, 2009 through July 24, 2014, the FDIC
authorized lawsuits in connection with 145 failed institutions against
1,171 individuals.11 The FDIC has filed 97 lawsuits against 749 former
directors and officers of failed financial institutions. Additional FDIC
lawsuits against officers and directors can be anticipated over the next
year or so, before the FDIC’s three-year statute of limitations expires.12
The FDIC does not typically litigate the cause of a bank’s failure,
nor does the FDIC seek to recover all DIF losses stemming from a
8. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at 3 (2011).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (2012). Courts have recognized that the FDIC
acts in a different capacity as a regulator than it does when it acts as a receiver. See
FDIC v. Skow, 741 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). The FDIC stands in the
shoes of the failed bank and has statutory authority, in its role as receiver, to recover for
creditors on their outstanding claims. Often, the largest creditor of the failed bank or
thrift is the FDIC itself, because its deposit fund pays insured depositors the full amount
of their claims.
10. By way of comparison, the FDIC brought claims against directors and officers
in 24% of the bank failures between 1985 and 1992. See Professional Liability
Lawsuits, FDIC (Oct. 6, 2014), available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/
failed/pls/.
11. Id.
12. The FDIC has the longer of three years from accrual, or the appropriate
limitations period under state law (whichever is longer), to bring tort claims and six
years from accrual, or the applicable period under state law, to bring breach of contract
claims. The date of accrual is the date the cause of action accrues under the applicable
law or the date of the appointment of the FDIC as receiver, whichever is longer. 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(B). In addition, claims alleging fraud, intentional misconduct
resulting in unjust enrichment or resulting in substantial loss to a failed institution may
be brought without regard to a limitations period under state law, if the limitations
period for such actions did not expire more than five years before the appointment of
the FDIC as the conservator or receiver. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(C).
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bank’s failure. The former is unnecessary, and the latter is pointless.
Instead, the FDIC takes a practical, cost-benefit approach to its Director
and Officer (“D&O”) litigation aimed at ascertaining recoverable
amounts (whether from insurance policies or potential defendants) and
determining whether it can build a credible case for negligence, breach
of fiduciary duty, or gross negligence to recover available amounts.
Thus, even though a bank failure may cost the DIF hundreds of millions
of dollars, it is not uncommon for the FDIC to file a D&O lawsuit
premised on a handful of problematic loans where the recoverable
damages are calibrated to the policy limits but amount to only a small
fraction of the total loss to the DIF.
Although the FDIC acknowledges on its website that directors are
entitled to business judgment protections—”[b]ank directors are allowed
to exercise business judgment without incurring legal liability”13—it
offers no such assurance to bank officers. In light of the economic
catastrophe that our country experienced and the resulting losses to the
DIF, there is tremendous pressure on the FDIC to scrutinize the
decisions of bank directors and, especially, bank officers with the
benefit of hindsight to search for possible bases for liability.
That pressure is offset, to a degree, by the fact that federal law
imposes a heightened liability requirement on the FDIC as Receiver
unless applicable state law provides a lower accountability threshold.
The Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989 (“FIRREA”) established gross negligence as a national minimum
standard for officer and director liability:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held
personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on
behalf of, or at the request or direction of [the FDIC] . . . acting as
conservator or receiver . . . for gross negligence, including any
similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a
duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional tortious
conduct, as such terms are defined and determined under applicable
State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right
14
of the Corporation under other applicable law.

13.
14.

Professional Liability Lawsuits, supra note 10.
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212(k), 103 Stat. 183, 243 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1989) (emphases added); see also Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213,
216 (1997) (“The federal statute . . . sets a ‘gross negligence’ floor, which applies as a
substitute for state standards that are more relaxed.”); FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510,
1516 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[Section] 1821(k) permits claims against directors for gross
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The statute, however, permits the FDIC to pursue claims against
officers and directors under a stricter standard of liability (e.g., ordinary
negligence) if authorized by state law.15 In most jurisdictions, a showing
of gross negligence (as defined by relevant state law)16 is the standard
for successful actions against officers and directors. Unless state law
permits officers and directors of a bank to be liable on a lesser showing
of culpability, a court will typically dismiss the FDIC’s ordinary
negligence claims.17
In order to circumvent this heightened standard, the FDIC may
elect to bring claims against officers in lieu of directors when the
circumstances permit. When it does sue officers, the FDIC frequently
relies upon state law negligence standards to argue that officers owe a
duty to exercise the care an ordinary prudent person would exercise in
similar circumstances, and that there is a lower standard to hold officers
liable than gross negligence. The remainder of this article explores the
interaction between this argument and the application of the business
judgment rule.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Directors of failed financial institutions alleged to have acted
negligently or in breach of their fiduciary duty may avail themselves of
the defense of the business judgment rule, which is a presumption that

negligence regardless of whether state law would require greater culpability.”)
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
15. See Stahl, 89 F.3d at 1515-16 (holding that while FIRREA’s gross negligence
standard displaced any federal common law negligence claims, § 1821(k)’s savings
clause allowed state law process due care claims to survive).
16. FDIC v. Aultman, No. 2:13-cv-58-FTM-384AM, 2013 WL 3357854, at *3
(M.D. Fla. July 3, 2013) (“FIRREA incorporates the definition of gross negligence
provided by relevant state law.”).
17. See, e.g., FDIC v. Briscoe, No. 1:11-CV-02303-SCJ, 2012 WL 8302215, at *5
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2012) (“Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of the
applicability of the business judgment rule is hereby GRANTED as to the ordinary
negligence and breach of fiduciary (based upon ordinary negligence) counts of the
Complaint.”); Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Boyle, No. Civ. A. 04CV1277DDD, 2005 WL
2455673 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2005); Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 230 B.R. 906 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
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their decisions were made in good faith.18 Generally speaking, the
business judgment rule focuses on the reasonableness of the process
used to reach a decision, and not on the ultimate outcome of that
decision. “‘Due care in the decision making context is process due care
only.’”19 The Delaware Supreme Court, for example, has held that
decisions of directors will be upheld “unless [they] cannot be ‘attributed
to any rational business purpose.’”20 The same court observed, in Brehm
v. Eisner, that “[i]rrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment
rule”21 and, in Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., that “[a] board of directors
enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will
not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business
purpose.”22 As one commentator has observed, “[t]he business judgment
rule applicable to directors and officers goes much further that the
honest-error-of-judgment rule of general tort law. . . . Under the
business judgment rule, there is no liability even though a decision is
unreasonable.”23
The business judgment rule originated in the common law, and first
appeared in the United States in Percy v. Millaudon, an 1829 decision of
the Louisiana Supreme Court.24 The case concerned the liability of bank
directors for the wrongdoing of the bank’s president and cashier. The
court absolved the directors of liability, explaining that a bank director is
not liable if he exercised ordinary care. In Godbold v. Branch Bank, the

18. See Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1461 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Under the
business judgment rule, courts presume that directors have acted properly and in good
faith.”).
19. Stewart v. BF Bolthouse Holdco, LLC, No. 8119-VCP, 2013 WL 5210220
(Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2013) (quoting McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1270 (Del. Ch.
2008)).
20. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del.
2006) (quoting Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
21. 746 A.2d 244, 264 & n.66 (Del. 2000).
22. 695 A.2d 43, 49 n.19 (Del. 1997) (quoting Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
23. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers,
51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 963 (1990); see also Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. N.Y.
Mercantile Exch., 735 F.2d 653, 678 n.32 (2d Cir. 1984) (Friendly, J.) (describing the
rationality test as “a minimal requirement of some basis in reason”); In re Caremark
Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that no liability for a
decision the fact finder believes to be “wrong,” “stupid,” or “egregious,” “so long as the
[decision-making process] was either rational or [was] employed in . . . good faith”
(emphasis omitted)).
24. 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 1829 WL 1592 (La. 1829).
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Alabama Supreme Court similarly absolved bank directors of
wrongdoing, explaining that a rule holding a director liable for any error
in decision-making would be “manifestly wrong” and that “[t]he
inevitable tendency of such a rule, would be hostile to the end proposed
by it, as no man of ordinary prudence would accept a trust surrounded
by such perils.”25
The justification for this widespread understanding of the business
judgment rule goes back to several basic principles resting at the core of
the traditional rule’s limitation of liability. First, subjecting corporate
decision-makers to liability for innocent mistakes deters them from
assuming risks that are necessary for business operations.26 As the
Delaware Chancery Court explained, by eliminating the prospect of
personal liability for ordinary errors in judgment, the rule “makes board
service by qualified persons more likely.”27 Second, as a matter of
institutional competence, judges and juries are poorly positioned to
assess the propriety of complex business decisions, both because they
lack the specialized skill, knowledge, and judgment of actual
businessmen,28 and because hindsight bias poses the risk that “a
reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed
years later against a background of perfect knowledge.”29

25.
26.

11 Ala. 191, 199, 1847 WL 159, at *6 (1847).
See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch.

1996).
27. In re Caremark Int’l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 971.
28. See W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co.
S’holders Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988).
29. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); see also In re Citigroup Inc.
S’holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 n.58 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“There is a substantial
risk that suing shareholders and reviewing judges will be unable to distinguish between
competent and negligent management because bad outcomes often will be regarded, expost, as having been foreseeable and, therefore, preventable ex-ante. If liability [arises]
from bad outcomes, without regard to the ex-ante quality of the decision or the
decision-making process, however, managers will be discouraged from taking risks.”
(first alternation in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE APPLICATION OF THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE TO BANK OFFICERS
The wisdom of extending the rule to officers has been debated,30
although many jurisdictions apply the business judgment rule to both
officers and directors.31 As one court has observed, “[a]lthough the
business judgment rule is usually defined in terms of the role of
corporate directors, it is equally applicable to corporate officers
exercising their authority.”32 Both the American Law Institute and the
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws endorse this expansive view of the
rule.33 Nonetheless, application of the business judgment rule to
30. Compare Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment
Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) (asserting that business judgment rule should not
extend to non-director officers), with Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks
III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson,
60 BUS. LAW. 865, 865 (2005) (“policy rationales underlying the development and
application of the business judgment rule to corporate directors similarly justify
application of the rule to non-director officers”).
31. See Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Corrpro Cos., 478 F.3d 557, 572 (3d
Cir. 2007); FDIC v. Briscoe, No. 1:11-cv-02303-SCJ, 2012 WL 8302215, at *4–5
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2012); Stanziale v. Nachtomi, 330 B.R. 56, 62–63 (D. Del. 2004),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 416 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2005); Grassmueck v. Barnett, No.
C03-122P, 2003 WL 22128263, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 7, 2003); Estate of Detwiler v.
Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying Michigan law);
Massaro v. Vernitron Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1068, 1080 (D. Mass. 1983) (applying
Delaware law); Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1261 n.16 (Conn.
1994); Selcke v. Bove, 629 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Potter v. Pohlad, 560
N.W.2d 389, 391–92 & n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Omnibank of Mantee v. United S.
Bank, 607 So. 2d 76, 85 (Miss. 1992); McKnight v. Midwest Eye Inst. of Kansas City,
Inc., 799 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Para-Med. Leasing, Inc. v. Hangen,
739 P.2d 717, 720-21 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
32. Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1261 n.16 (Conn. 1994).
33. See ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act Pertaining to the Standards of Conduct for Officer; Inspection Rights
and Notices—Final Adoption, 54 BUS. LAW. 1229, 1231 (1999) (“[T]he business
judgment rule will normally apply to decisions within an officer’s discretionary
authority.”); American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis
and Recommendations § 4.01 cmt. a (1994) (“Sound public policy points in the
direction of holding officers to the same duty of care and business judgment standards
as directors . . . .”); see also 3A William M. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 1039, at 45 (perm rev. ed. 1986), § 1039, at 4 (Supp. 1992) (“It is too
well settled to admit of controversy that ordinarily neither the directors nor the other
officers of a corporation are liable for mere mistakes or errors of judgment . . . . This
rule is commonly referred to as the ‘business judgment rule,’ and applies to decisions of
executive officers as well as those of directors.”) (citations omitted).
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corporate officers is not well settled in every jurisdiction,34 and has
come under attack by the FDIC in numerous receivership cases. The
FDIC’s choice of defendants sometimes appears to be driven by a
tactical desire to deprive defendants of business judgment protection.
For example, it is not uncommon for the FDIC to sue former bank
officers (and officer-directors, but only in their capacity as officers of
the bank) for wrongdoing and then argue that the defendants are not
entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule.35 The resolution
of this issue has important ramifications for the FDIC’s ability to
establish liability in typical receivership cases.
None of the traditional justifications for the rule—encouraging
corporate service, incentivizing appropriate decision-making, or
preventing hindsight-based criticisms—suggests that officers and
directors should be treated differently; indeed, stripping officers of their
protection under the business judgment statute would be particularly
problematic in the banking industry, where officers and directors
sometimes sit on the same committees and sometimes are called upon to
make the exact same business decisions—when it comes to approving
loans, for example, there is little difference between an officers loan
committee and a directors loan committee other than the amount of
loans at issue.
A. ENCOURAGING CORPORATE SERVICE
A typical justification for applying business judgment protection to
directors stems from the fear that qualified individuals will refrain from
advising companies due to liability exposure. As one federal court
explained:

34. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 398–99 (6th ed.
2009) (“Numerous courts, construing the law of Delaware and the law of other states,
have referred to the business judgment rule as a doctrine protecting directors and
officers without distinguishing between the rule’s applicability to directors and officers.
There is, however, only sparse case law that specifically addresses this question.”
(citations omitted)).
35. See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Plaintiff at 5, FDIC v. Smith,
Civ. Action No. 2:13-cv-14151 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2014) (“Plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment on the statutory business judgment rule defense . . . because all
defendants are sued in their capacity as officers (or members of management), not as
directors.”).
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Compelling reasons exist for limiting the circumstances under which
directors may be held personally liable. Directors, particularly bank
directors, regularly make complex decisions involving risk, and
many such decisions may appear in hindsight to have been made
improvidently. Competent persons would not serve as directors if
36
such decisions could lead to liability under ordinary tort standards.

The operative question here is whether business judgment
protections are needed to encourage competent individuals to assume
management roles within a bank. Unlike directors, officers receive
salaries and bonuses and derive a substantial portion of their income
from their employment. Director compensation tends to be less
significant. But the compensation afforded to bank officers does not
vitiate this particular rationale for extending business judgment
protection to them. After all, a banker’s salary pales in comparison to
the millions of dollars of potential liability the FDIC has demanded from
hundreds of defendant officers in the aftermath of the Great Recession.37
And while exculpatory clauses enshrined in statutes provide defenses to
certain types of claims,38 including breach of the duty of care and breach
of fiduciary duties, these statutes generally apply to directors, but not to
officers. For example, Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law limits directors’ personal liability for monetary
damages for breaches of the duty of care.39 Many other states have
36.
37.

RTC v. Blasdell, 930 F. Supp. 417, 423 (D. Ariz. 1994).
See Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 30, at 871 (“[T]he scope of potential
negligence-based liability for officers is enormous in comparison to any but the most
generous incentive compensation packages: even at the median $3 million level, CEO
compensation (let alone presumably lesser compensation for more junior officers) is
trivially small in relation to corporate harm potentially arising from officer neglect.”).
38. Delaware courts recognize that the exculpatory clause serves a salutary
purpose, i.e., “to encourage directors to undertake risky, but potentially valuemaximizing business strategies, so long as they do so in good faith.” Prod. Res. Grp.
LLC v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 777 (Del. Ch. 2004).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014) (allowing a corporate charter to
include “[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a
director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a
director: (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit. No such
provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omission
occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective. All references in
this paragraph to a director shall also be deemed to refer to such other person or
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statutes that grant similar protections to directors,40 but only a handful
have extended the same protections to officers.41 In most states, officers
lack these protections, making officers more financially vulnerable than
directors, and making business judgment rule protections even more
essential.
Officers usually devote far more time to the institution than
directors. Unlike a director whose interaction with the bank is likely to
be episodic at best, a corporate officer presumably will devote his or her
complete attention to the bank’s business on a daily basis. But an
officer’s full-time position does not mean that his or her judgments
should receive less protection. After all, a full-time position does not
guarantee that a corporate officer, any more than a director, will be able
to control the outcome of the underlying business decisions. If the
aftermath of the Great Recession has taught us anything, it is that
business strategies can go awry for many reasons and that no individual
person, whether officer or director, has the ability to guarantee a good
outcome no matter how much time they devote to the task.
B. INCENTIVIZING APPROPRIATE DECISION-MAKING
Another rationale underlying the business judgment rule is to
incentivize appropriate decision-making. An officer whose judgments
may be second-guessed is more likely to make decisions that minimize
risk. The issue, in other words, “is not whether people will serve as
corporate officers; the issue is whether, once serving, officers will be
unduly cautious in their business conduct if faced with liability for lack
of ordinary care.”42 To borrow a basketball analogy, without the
protections afforded by the business judgment rule, bank officers might

persons, if any, who, pursuant to a provision of the certificate of incorporation in
accordance with § 141(a) of this title, exercise or perform any of the powers or duties
otherwise conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this title.”).
40. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 402(b)(1) (McKinney 2014); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-418(a)(1)–(2) (West 2014).
41. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-418(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:24(C)(4) (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037(2) (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:27(3) (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A)(1) (2014). Notably, Nevada provides
exculpation for both directors and officers “unless it is proven that . . . [his] breach of
those duties involved intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law.”
NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (2014).
42. Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 30, at 873.
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go into the equivalent of a “four corners” offense, simply passing the
ball near half-court without making any serious attempt to score. Just
like playing a “prevent” defense in football when you are ahead seems
to do nothing but prevent your team from winning, adopting an overly
conservative business approach can harm a bank’s capital cushion and,
in extreme cases, doom it to failure. In short, being too conservative can
be as damaging as being too aggressive. A bank can miss out on
strategic opportunities and ultimately find itself in a weaker, more
vulnerable position than had it taken calculated business risks. In
addition to directors, officers too should be encouraged to aim for that
regulatory sweet spot of reasoned decision-making that supports
reasonable risks. The business judgment rule encourages reasonable
risk-taking by ensuring that officers, like directors, are not guarantors of
the business outcome that flows from their strategy.
C. DISCOURAGING SECOND-GUESSING
Courts also recognize that business judgment protection functions
as an insurance policy against hindsight-based second-guessing of board
decisions. This rationale applies with equal force to decisions made by
bank officers. Bank officers make decisions every day that reflect
reasoned risk/benefit calculations but where the ultimate outcome is
beyond their control. For example, bank officers must weigh numerous
factors in deciding whether and under what circumstances the bank
should lend its money. Does a self-employed borrower have a
sufficiently stable source of income? What is the appropriate interest
rate to charge or term to offer? Is the value of the collateral sufficient to
offset the risk of the loan to the bank? Should the bank make more of
certain types of loans, such as residential real estate loans, or should its
focus be elsewhere, such as commercial and industrial loans? These and
a host of other issues routinely present themselves in a typical officerlevel loan committee. And in those institutions that have a director-level
loan committee, the same issues arise albeit with greater financial
consequences (reflecting the fact that most director-level loan
committees do not review and approve individual loans unless they
exceed a certain monetary threshold). There is no principled basis for
protecting directors from second-guessing but leaving bank officers
exposed to hindsight-based criticisms.43
43. As Hamermesh and Sparks have noted, “at least where an officer is simply
attempting to implement board policy and exercise delegated corporate authority,
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IV. CASE STUDIES ILLUSTRATING THE RANGE OF BUSINESS JUDGMENT
PROTECTIONS AFFORDED TO BANK OFFICERS
Over the past few years, federal courts in Georgia, California, and
Florida have addressed questions regarding the applicability of the
business judgment rule to bank officers. Although they do not all reach
the same outcome, these three states illustrate the way that courts have
evaluated the common law in their state, reconciled statutory
enactments, and drawn conclusions in this area.
A. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN GEORGIA
Georgia courts have a long history of affording both corporate
officers and directors the protection of the business judgment rule. Until
recently, though, there was some uncertainty about whether bank
officers were entitled to this protection.
In Brock Built, LLC v. Blake, the Court of Appeals of Georgia held
that “[i]n determining whether a corporate officer has fulfilled his or her
statutory duty, Georgia courts apply the business judgment rule.”44 The
court observed that “[t]he business judgment rule affords an officer the
presumption that he or she acted in good faith, and absolves the officer
of personal liability unless it is established that he or she engaged in
fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion.”45 The court also concluded
that Georgia’s business judgment rule foreclosed liability against both
officers and directors for ordinary negligence.46 As the Brock court
explained, Georgia courts will not interfere with the decisions of
directors or officers absent “fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of discretion.”47

imposing a more demanding standard of liability upon officers than upon directors
seems unfair in that it would shift to officers the burden of legal liability for risk-taking
activity that the directors themselves encouraged.” Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note
30, at 872.
44. 300 Ga. App. 816, 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
45. Id. at 821–22.
46. See also Regenstein v. J. Regenstein Co., 213 Ga. 157, 162 (Ga. 1957) (stating
that “unless sufficient facts are alleged which show that such a course is pursued for
reasons which are fraudulent, ultra vires, or illegal, a court of equity will not interfere to
control the management of a corporation.”); Flexible Prods. Co. v. Ervast, 284 Ga. App.
178, 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that Georgia’s business judgment rule “forecloses
liability in officers and directors for ordinary negligence.”).
47. Brock, 300 Ga. App. at 822 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Notwithstanding this solid body of law, the FDIC argued—with
limited initial success—that bank officers in Georgia were not entitled to
the protections of the business judgment rule.48 Two federal courts
certified this question to the Supreme Court of Georgia,49 with one
observing that “no Georgia state court has explicitly extended the
business judgment rule to protect . . . [bank] officers and directors” on
its way to rejecting the reasoning of federal court rulings that had
applied the rule in the banking context.50 The court observed:
There is every reason to treat bank officers and directors differently
from general corporate officers and directors. In general, when a
business corporation succeeds or fails, its stockbrokers bear the gains
and losses. . . . But when a bank, instead of a business corporation
fails, the FDIC and ultimately the taxpayer bear the pecuniary loss.
The lack of care of the officers and directors of banks can lead to
bank closures which echo throughout the local and national
51
economy.

Because the case “is not simply a private case between individuals
but rather a case that involves a federal agency appointed as receiver of
a failed bank in the midst of a national banking crisis,” the court was
“not convinced that Georgia law affords the Defendants the protection
of the business judgment rule in a lawsuit by the FDIC.”52 In reaching
this conclusion, the court found that decisions affording bank officers
and directors the business judgment rule defense were in tension with
Official Code of Georgia Annotated Section 7-1-490, which imposes on
bank officers and directors the duty of care that “ordinarily prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.”53 Because
the court was “not convinced that Georgia law affords the Defendants

48. Compare FDIC v. Miller, No. 2:12-cv- 00042 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 26, 2012); FDIC
v. Whitley, No. 2:12-cv-170 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2012); FDIC v. Briscoe, No. 1:11-CV02303-SCJ, 2012 WL 8302215 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2012); FDIC v. Blackwell, No.
1:11-CV-03423-RWS, 2012 WL 3230490 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 3, 2012) (applying business
judgment rule to bank officers); with FDIC v. Adams, No. 1:12-cv-00726-JOF (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 21, 2013) (refusing to apply business judgment rule to bank officers); FDIC v.
Loudermilk, 984 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
49. See Loudermilk, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 1354; FDIC v. Skow, 741 F.3d 1342 (11th
Cir. 2013).
50. Loudermilk, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 1358.
51. Id. at 1359 (citation omitted).
52. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the protection of the business judgment rule in a lawsuit by the FDIC,”54
it certified the following “unsettled question of law” to the Georgia
Supreme Court: “Does the business judgment rule in Georgia preclude
as a matter of law a claim for ordinary negligence against the officers
and directors of a bank in a lawsuit brought by the FDIC as receiver for
the bank?”55
In FDIC v. Skow, the district court granted defendants’ motion to
dismiss the ordinary negligence claims, holding that under Georgia law
the negligence claims that the FDIC brought against former bank
officers and directors failed to state a claim as a matter of law.56 On
appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit was concerned that applying the
business judgment rule to bank officers and directors “might contradict
the plain language” of the Georgia statute holding bank directors and
officers to an ordinary negligence standard of care.57 “In the light of the
plausible conflict between the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490 and
the state intermediate appellate courts’ discussions of Georgia’s business
judgment rule,”58 the court certified the following two questions to the
Supreme Court of Georgia:
(1) Does a bank director or officer violate the standard of care
established by O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490 when he acts in good faith but
fails to act with “ordinary diligence,” as that term is defined in
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-2?
(2) In a case like this one, applying Georgia’s business judgment
rule, can the bank officer or director defendants be held individually
liable if they, in fact as alleged, are shown to have been ordinarily
negligent or to have breached a fiduciary duty, based on ordinary
59
negligence in performing professional duties?

In the recent Loudermilk and Skow decisions, the Georgia Supreme
Court definitively answered the questions raised by these two federal
courts. In the Loudermilk decision, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
corporate officers, including bank officers, are entitled to business
judgment protection. The Court began its analysis by examining whether
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
FDIC v. Loudermilk, 761 S.E.2d 332, 334 (Ga. 2014).
955 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
FDIC v. Skow, 741 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1347.
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Georgia common law recognizes the business judgment rule. After
examining three common law cases that the Court deemed “especially
instructive,” the Georgia Supreme Court held:
From our precedents, we conclude that the business judgment rule is
a settled part of our common law in Georgia, and it generally
precludes claims against officers and directors for their business
decisions that sound in ordinary negligence, except to the extent that
those decisions are shown to have been made without deliberation,
without the requisite diligence to ascertain and assess the facts and
circumstances upon which the decisions are based, or in bad faith.
Put another way, the business judgment rule at common law
forecloses claims against officers and directors that sound in
ordinary negligence when the alleged negligence concerns only the
wisdom of their judgment, but it does not absolutely foreclose such
claims to the extent that a business decision did not involve
“judgment” because it was made in a way that did not comport with
the duty to exercise good faith and ordinary care. We note as well
that the business judgment rule applies equally at common law to
corporate officers and directors generally and to bank officers and
60
directors.

The Court then analyzed whether the legislature had abrogated the
common law business judgment protection when it enacted Official
Code of Georgia Annotated Section 7-1-490(a), which provides that
“[d]irectors and officers of a bank . . . shall discharge the duties of their
respective positions in good faith and with that diligence, care, and skill
which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar
circumstances in like positions,”61 and goes on to enumerate sources of
information that officers and directors are entitled to rely upon in good
faith. The Court disagreed with the position advanced by the FDIC that
this statute supersedes the common law business judgment rule. The
Court reconciled the rule with the statute by pointing out that the statute
is “largely addressed to the process by which an officer or director is to
become informed about the matters as to which he is to exercise
judgment.”62 As the Court later explained, the “statutory reference to
ordinary ‘diligence, care, and skill’ is most reasonably understood to
refer to the care required with respect to the process by which a decision
is made, most notably the diligence due to ascertain the relevant facts.”63
60.
61.
62.
63.

Loudermilk, 761 S.E.2d at 338.
Id. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341–42.
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In the companion Skow case, the Georgia Supreme Court
reaffirmed its emphasis on the underlying process that bank officers
utilize to make their decisions. The Court held that good faith, by itself,
was not sufficient to preclude liability if the officer, “with respect to the
process by which he makes decisions, fails to exercise the diligence,
care, and skill of ordinarily prudent men [acting] under similar
circumstances in like positions.”64
The Georgia Supreme Court’s efforts to reconcile common law
business judgment protections with a statutory ordinary negligence
provision echoes the positions taken by other states that have addressed
this issue. Like Georgia, a host of other states provide the identical
standard of care for officers and directors, and yet apply the business
judgment rule to bar ordinary negligence claims. For example, Maine
requires bank and non-bank directors and officers to discharge their
duties with ordinary care,65 but insulates them from liability unless they
were grossly negligent.66 New Jersey also imposes an ordinary
negligence standard on bank and non-bank directors,67 but shields them
from liability absent gross negligence.68 Alabama also requires bank and
non-bank directors to conform with the ordinary negligence standard of
care,69 but shields them from liability so long as they acted “in good
faith and without gross negligence supporting an imputation of fraud.”70
B. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN CALIFORNIA
California courts have reached a different, and only slightly less
definitive answer, when it comes to the scope of the business judgment
rule in that state. In Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, the court
explained that California’s business judgment rule “has two components
– immunization from liability that is codified at Corporations Code
Section 309 and a judicial policy of deference to the exercise of good
faith business judgment in management decisions.”71 Notwithstanding
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

FDIC v. Skow, 763 S.E.2d 879, 881 (Ga. 2014).
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-C, §§ 831(2), 843(1)(B) (2014).
See id. § 832(1)(B) (directors), § 843(3) (officers).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14(1) (West 2014).
See, e.g., Fink v. Codey (In re PSE & G S’holder Litig.), 801 A.2d 295, 306
(N.J. 2002).
69. ALA. CODE § 10A-2-8.30(a)(2) (2011).
70. Deal v. Johnson, 362 So. 2d 214, 218 (Ala. 1978).
71. 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1048 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
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this dual-faceted scheme, courts have found that neither the statute nor
the common law protects an officer’s business judgments in California.
Section 309 of California General Corporation Law, titled
“Performance of [D]uties by [D]irector; liability,” provides in relevant
part as follows:
(a) A director shall perform the duties of a director, including duties
as a member of any committee of the board upon which the director
may serve, in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and with
such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. . . .
(c) A person who performs the duties of a director in accordance
with subdivisions (a) and (b) shall have no liability based upon
any alleged failure to discharge the person’s obligations as a
72
director. . . .

While some California courts, such as the court in Berg & Berg,
have characterized the statute as codifying the “immunization from
liability” component of the business judgment rule, the California Law
Revision Commission in 1996 observed that “Section 309 does not
codify the business judgment rule; it codifies the duty of care of
directors, upon which the business judgment rule acts as a limitation.”73
This protection is limited, by its terms, only to directors. No court in
California has found that this statutory protection extends to officers.
The common law provides no recourse for officers in California.
Although courts agree that the “judicial policy of deference to the
exercise of good-faith business judgment in management decisions”
remains a protection afforded not by statute, but by California’s
common law business judgment rule,74 a number of federal district
courts in California over the past three years have held that neither
Section 309 nor the common law rule extends the business judgment
defense to corporate officers.75 In FDIC v. Perry,76 for example, the

72.
73.

CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (1975) (emphasis added).
See CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, MEMORANDUM 96-12, at 4 (Jan.
30, 1996), available at www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/1996/M96-12.pdf.
74. FDIC v. Van Dellen, No. CV 10-4915 DSF, 2012 WL 4815159 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
5, 2012); Berg & Berg, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1048; Lee v. Interinsurance Exch., 50 Cal.
App. 4th 694, 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
75. See FDIC v. Hawker, No. CV F 12-0127, 2012 WL 2068773 (E.D. Cal. June 7,
2012); Van Dellen, 2012 WL 4815159; FDIC v. Faigin, No. CV 12-03448 DDP, 2013

386

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

court determined that the plain language of Section 309 of the statute,
which is framed solely in terms of directors and its legislative history,77
supports the conclusion that the protections of the statute do not extend
to corporate officers. The court also held that it was unable to find any
California judicial decisions applying the common law business
judgment rule to corporate officers, and therefore refused to do so in that
case.78 These decisions have focused (1) on the language and legislative
history of Section 309, and (2) on the ruling of the California Court of
Appeals in Gaillard v. Natomas Co.,79 which held that the business
judgment rule did not apply to directors’ approval of golden parachute
agreements because the directors were not performing the duties of
directors but acting as officers.80
Although the argument for extending business judgment protection
to corporate officers is not technically foreclosed (given that the
WL 3389490, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013); Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. Siravo,
No. CV 10-1597-GW, 2011 WL 8332969 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2011).
76. No. CV 11-5561-DDW, 2012 WL 589569 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012).
77. The legislative committee that drafted Section 309 stated, as relevant: “[I]t is
the intent of the draftsmen of this provision, by combining the requirement of good
faith within the standard of care, to incorporate the familiar concept that, these criteria
being satisfied, a director should not be liable for an honest mistake of business
judgment.” See Cal. Corp. Code § 309 (Legislative Committee Comment) (1975)
(noting that “[t]he standard of care does not include officers,” reasoning that,
“[a]lthough a non-director officer may have a duty of care similar to that of a director . .
. his ability to rely on factual information, reports or statements may, depending upon
the circumstances of the particular case, be more limited than in the case of a director in
view of the greater obligation he may have to be familiar with the affairs of the
corporation.”).
78. Perry, 2012 WL 589569, at *3 (“Defendant’s proposition, however, seems
unprecedented as the Court’s research reveals no judicial decision in California
applying common law BJR to corporate officers.”).
79. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
80. The California Law Revision Commission initially criticized that decision in a
preliminary report recommending that the business judgment rule be codified to include
officers, arguing that the court reached the right outcome for the wrong reason—
namely, that the Gaillard officers did not deserve protection because they were
interested in the transaction. See CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note
73, at 4. But the Commission softened its stance in its final report, recommending that
the proposed “codification of the business judgment rule should be limited to directors,
and that its possible application to officers be made the subject of a separate study.
Codification of the business judgment rule for directors should not affect the common
law and existing statutory protection of officers and employees.” CALIFORNIA LAW
REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION, at 17-18 (1998).
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California Supreme Court has not addressed this issue), the decisions to
date paint a bleak picture about its prospects. There are a handful of
cases that can be read to support the argument,81 but a three-year
unbroken string of federal court decisions interpreting state law to the
contrary presents a formidable obstacle.
C. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN FLORIDA.
Unlike Georgia and California, where the scope of business
judgment protections are clearly demarcated, the availability of a
business judgment defense to corporate officers in Florida is unsettled.
In recent cases brought against bank officers, the FDIC has taken the
position that Florida’s limitation-of-liability statute does not apply to
officers and abrogates the common law business judgment protections
that existed prior to its enactment. The FDIC’s arguments have met with
mixed success.
1. The Florida Limitation-of-Liability Statute
The Florida limitation-of-liability statute, which took effect in
1987, speaks only in terms of directors. It provides that a director must
discharge his or her duties “(a) [i]n good faith; (b) [w]ith the care an
ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances; and (c) [i]n a manner he or she reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation.”82 The statute then narrows the
actions that can impose liability on directors of Florida banks, limiting
liability to situations where there has been a criminal violation, an
improper personal benefit, or conduct that was “in bad faith or with
malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful
disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”83
By virtue of this statute, “imposition of liability on a director
requires not only a violation of the duty of ordinary care set forth in Fla.
81. See, e.g., Frances T. v. Vil. Green Owners Ass’n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 497 n.14
(Cal. 1986) (en banc) (suggesting application of the rule to corporate officers); Biren v.
Equality Emergency Med. Grp., 102 Cal. App. 4th 125, 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(concluding officer director was protected by the business judgment rule); PMC, Inc. v.
Kadisha, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1368, 1386–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“Generally, an officer
or director who commits a tort because he or she reasonably relied on expert advice or
other information cannot be held personally liable for the resulting harm.”).
82. FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(1) (2014).
83. FLA. STAT. § 607.0831.
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Stat. § 607.0830, but a violation that falls into one of the five categories
set forth in Fla. Stat. § 607.0831(1)(b).”84 When the FDIC brings suit, its
claims generally fall within § 607.0831(1)(b)(4), which applies when the
allegations allege “conscious disregard for the best interest of the
corporation, or willful misconduct.”85 Claims against directors for
ordinary negligence are not cognizable under the statute,86 which
accords with the general rule that directors cannot be sued for garden
variety negligence claims.
Initially, some federal courts did not draw a distinction between
directors and officers when applying the limitation-of-liability statute. In
1988, less than one year after the statute went into effect, a court in the
Southern District of Florida observed that “the Florida legislature has
recently passed [an] Act . . . which created greater protections from
liability for official acts in their capacity of corporate officers and
directors.”87 Five years later, in Gonzalez-Gorrondona, another court in
that district was presented with a case in which the FDIC brought a
claim for ordinary negligence based on director and officer conduct that
occurred between March 1983 and December 1988—a range that
spanned July 1, 1987, the date on which the Florida limitation-ofliability statute took effect.88 As to conduct post-dating the effective date
of the statute, the court held that “the Florida statute insulates corporate
directors and officers from conduct amounting to gross negligence, and
permits liability only for greater derelictions of the duty of care.”89
Evaluating the conduct by the defendant directors and officers, the Court
84. FDIC v. Price, No. 2:12-cv-148-FTM-99DNF, 2012 WL 3242316, at *6 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 8, 2012).
85. FLA. STAT. § 607.0831(1)(b)(4). Florida law defines “[g]ross negligence” as
conduct “so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or
indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such conduct.” Fla. Stat.
§ 768.72(2)(b). Florida courts have found willful misconduct to be the same standard as
gross negligence. See, e.g., FDIC v. Aultman, No. 2:13-cv-58-FTM-384AM, 2013 WL
3357854, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 2013); FDIC v. Florescue, No. 8:12-cv-2547-T30TBM, 2013 WL 2477246, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 2013); Wood v. Musa, 168 So.
2d 701, 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (“Gross negligence and willful or wanton
misconduct mean the same thing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
86. See Florescue, 2013 WL 2477246, at *3; FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833
F. Supp. 1554, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
87. Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 685 F. Supp. 1230, 1238 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (emphasis
added), aff’d, 874 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1989).
88. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. at 1556.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
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ruled that the “challenged corporate decisions . . . made prior to July 1,
1987 will be subject to an ordinary standard of care” but “any
misconduct alleged to have taken place after July 1, 1987 must be
scrutinized according to the ‘gross negligence’ standard of § 1821(k) of
FIRREA.”90 In other words, the Court dismissed the ordinary negligence
claims with respect to all conduct that occurred after the effective date
of the statute. Because the defendants in Gonzalez-Gorrondona were
directors and officers,91 the import of that decision was that the statutory
protection of Section 607.0831 extended to officers as well.
This interpretation of Section 607.0831 was subsequently endorsed
by the Eleventh Circuit, which recognized in 1996 that “[t]he Florida
legislature passed [Section 607.0831] to afford corporate officers and
directors greater protection from liability.”92 In Stahl, the FDIC brought
negligence claims against former officers and directors of a savings and
loan association, alleging that the defendants had negligently approved
deficient loans, and the defendants claimed the protection of the
business judgment rule. Because the conduct at issue in Stahl occurred
prior to the effective date of Section 607.0831, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the standard of care under Florida law was ordinary negligence.93
But as a corollary to this holding, the court specifically identified that
Section 607.0831 created “greater protection from liability” for “causes
of action accruing on or after July 1, 1987,” and that this protection was
afforded to “corporate officers and directors.”94 Thus, for the first
quarter-century that Florida’s limitation-of-liability statute was in effect,
90. Id. at 1559; see also id. at 1556 (“In sum, prior to July 1, 1987, the law of
Florida imposed liability on corporate directors and officers for simple negligence, and
after that date, Florida imposed liability only for acts constituting more than gross
negligence.”).
91. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. at 1548.
92. FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1516 n.12 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); see
also id. at 1517–18 (citing with approval the analysis in Gonzalez-Gorrondona).
93. Id. at 1516.
94. Id. at 1516 n.12; see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Toy King
Distribs., Inc. v. Liberty Sav. Bank (In re Toy King Distribs., Inc.), 256 B.R. 1, 168
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (“[T]o overcome the presumption of the business judgment
rule under [Section 607.0831], the plaintiff must establish . . . that the officer or
director has been more than grossly negligent.” (emphasis added)); FDIC v. Mintz, 816
F. Supp. 1541, 1545–46 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (“Florida has passed an ‘insulating’ statute
which was intended to afford greater protection against suit for directors and officers.”);
Brandt v. Bassett (In re Se. Banking Corp.), 827 F. Supp. 742, 755 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(“Florida also arguably applies the Business Judgment Rule to officers.”), rev’d on
other grounds, 69 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1995).
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courts, as clear holding or dictum, interpreted its protections as
extending to both officers and directors.
More recently, though, several Florida federal courts have
concluded that the limitation-of-liability statute is more circumscribed,
protecting directors but not officers from FDIC claims of ordinary
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. In FDIC v. Brudnicki, the court
denied a motion to dismiss filed by a director-officer.95 The court
concluded that “legislators intentionally differentiated between
directors, officers, employees, and agents . . . . Officers, employees, and
agents may be liable for something less than conscious disregard for the
best interests of the corporation or willful misconduct.”96 In FDIC v.
Florescue, another court followed the reasoning in Brudnicki, but
observed that “[w]hether § 607.0831 extends to an officer-director is an
unsettled issue under Florida law.”97 Both decisions acknowledge that
Gonzalez-Gorrondona established a contrary view.98 To date, this issue
remains unresolved, although the more recent cases refusing to apply the
limitation-of-liability statute suggest that courts look more skeptically at
this argument now than they did before.99
2. Florida’s Common Law Business Judgment Rule
But even if the limitation-of-liability statute provides no refuge,
bank officers in Florida may still avail themselves of common law
business judgment protections to defend themselves against FDIC
liability claims. A number of Florida decisions that both pre-date and
post-date the enactment of Florida’s limitation of liability statute
recognize a common law business judgment protection for officers.100 In
95.
96.
97.

No. 5:12-cv-398-RS-GRJ, 2013 WL 2145720, at *2 (N.D. Fla. May 15, 2013).
Id.
FDIC v. Florescue, No. 8:12-cv-2547-T-30TBM, 2013 WL 2477246, at *4
(M.D. Fla. June 10, 2013).
98. See id. (citing Gonzalez-Gorrondona as dictum); Brudnicki, 2013 WL
2145720, at *2 (“Interpreting the statute during its infancy, one federal district court
found ‘that the Florida statute insulates corporate directors and officers . . . .’” (ellipsis
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp.
1554, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1993)).
99. See Order Denying Motion for Partial Dismissal at 4-5, FDIC v. Dodson, et al.,
No. 4:13-cv-416-MW-CAS (N.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2014) (holding that “officers are not
shielded from personal liability” by Section 607.0831).
100. See, e.g., Schein v. Caesar’s World, Inc., 491 F.2d 17, 18–20 (5th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam) (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant “officers and
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a recent FDIC case litigated and eventually settled in the Southern
District of Florida, the officer defendants moved to dismiss the FDIC’s
claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty on the ground that
their judgments were protected by either the limitation-of-liability
statute or the common law business judgment rule. Without expressly
addressing their statutory argument, the court found “application of the
business judgment rule [to be] a question of fact and therefore
inappropriate for consideration on a motion to dismiss.”101 The court did
not accept the argument advanced by the FDIC that there was no
common law business judgment rule.
Under the common law rule Florida courts will presume that
officers and directors acted in good faith, in the absence of a showing of
“abuse of discretion, fraud, bad faith, or illegality.”102 In AmeriFirst
Bank v. Bomar, the court made this point emphatically:
Under the business judgment rule, officers and directors of a
corporation are presumed to have acted properly and in good faith.
Although required to discharge their duties with the diligence and
skill of an ordinary prudent person in a like position under similar
circumstances, officers and directors “incur no liability to the
corporation for issues of business expediency which they resolve
through the mere exercise of their business judgment.” Thus, unless
there is a showing of an abuse of discretion, fraud, bad faith or
illegality, a court will not substitute its own judgment for that of
103
corporate management.

directors” because the undisputed facts established that defendants’ actions were
“indisputably a sound exercise of their business judgment”); Pujals ex rel. El Rey de los
Habanos, Inc. v. Garcia, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1327, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (refusing to
strike business judgment rule defense for defendant “officers and directors,” and stating
that “[t]he business judgment rule is a judicial presumption that corporate officers and
directors acted in good faith”); AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1376
(S.D. Fla. 1991) (“Under the business judgment rule, officers and directors of a
corporation are presumed to have acted properly and in good faith.”); Univ. Clinical
Assocs., Inc. v. Intracoastal Health Sys., Inc., No. CL 99-7605 AG, 2000 WL 1466097,
at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 25, 2000) (describing the business judgment rule as a defense
available to officers and directors).
101. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 8, FDIC v. Smith, et al.,
2:13-cv-14151-DLG, (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013).
102. Kloha v. Duda, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
103. 757 F. Supp. at 1376 (citations omitted); see also Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v.
O’Rourke, No. 00-020282 (09), 2007 WL 7035809 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 12, 2007)
(“[O]fficers and directors of a valid corporation are afforded protection under the
Business Judgment Rule, no matter how poor their business judgment, unless it is
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There is no textual support for the assertion that the limitation-ofliability statute displaced the common law business judgment rule.
Section 11 of the Florida limitation-of-liability statute also states that
“[n]othing in this act shall be construed as increasing or decreasing the
liability of any person not herein specifically delineated.”104 To the
extent that officers are deemed not to be encompassed by the statutory
protection, then nothing in the statute affects their common law
protections. As one Florida court observed in a different context, “The
presumption is that no change in the common law is intended unless the
statute is explicit and clear in that regard.”105
Not surprisingly, Florida courts generally have rejected arguments
that the limitation-of-liability statute abrogated the common law
business judgment rule.106 For example, in Brandt v. Bassett (In re
Southeast Banking Corp.), the court ruled that “[t]here is nothing in the
statute that expressly indicates that it has affected the Business
Judgment Rule. The legislative history . . . does not indicate that the
legislature intended to affect the Business Judgment Rule. . . . [T]here is
no case law to support the contention that the business judgment rule has
been subsumed by the Florida statute.”107 Likewise, in Banco Latino
International v. Gomez Lopez, the court observed that “[t]hrough both
statute and case law, Florida has developed rather strict standards for
imposing personal liability upon corporate officers and directors for
actions taken in their official capacities.”108 In support of this point, the
Court cited both Section 607.0831 and In re Southeast Banking Corp.,
which the Court described as “discussing the case law developing

alleged and there is proof they acted fraudulently, illegally, oppressively and in bad
faith.”).
104. 1987 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 87-245, § 11 (West).
105. Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla.1990).
106. See Kloha, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 1244 n.20 (recognizing that the rule survives the
statute, but observing that the case law “remains unclear as regards the complete
relationship between the business judgment rule and Florida Statute § 607.0830”).
Several other courts have applied Florida’s common law business judgment rule even
after the enactment of the 1987 statute. See In re Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 316 F.3d
1192, 1194-95 (11th Cir. 2003); Pujals ex rel. El Rey De Los Habanos, Inc. v. Garcia,
777 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1327, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Bomar, 757 F. Supp. at 1376.
107. 827 F. Supp. 742, 755 (S.D. Fla. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 69 F.3d 1539
(11th Cir. 1995).
108. 95 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (emphases added).
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Florida’s standard for imposing officer and director liability and the
business judgment rule affirmative defense.”109
Common law rules remain in force unless they are inconsistent with
acts of the Florida legislature.110 There is obviously nothing
“inconsistent” about providing business judgment protections through
both the statute and the common law; indeed, if the FDIC is correct that
Section 607.0831 covers only directors, then a separate and continuing
common law protection for officers is not merely consistent but essential
to the overall slate of business judgment protections under Florida law.
Accordingly, the Southern District of Florida’s conclusion in In re
Southeast Banking Corp. remains true: nothing in the statute, its
legislative history or the relevant case law indicates that the statute has
affected the business judgment rule.111 Although sound arguments can
be made that bank officers are entitled to assert the business judgment
defense, whether under the limitation-of-liability statute or the common
law, it remains to be seen how courts will interpret and apply these
protections.
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN ASSERTING THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT DEFENSE
Although the business judgment rule can be a formidable defense,
its deterrent effect is lessened if defendants cannot use it to knock out
claims for simple negligence or breach of fiduciary duty prior to trial. In
addition to arguing that business judgment protection is not available as
a matter of law, the FDIC typically also contends that it is inappropriate
for the court to consider it at the motion to dismiss stage. Several courts
have endorsed this argument, holding that the business judgment rule is
too fact-intensive to be disposed of on a motion to dismiss. For example,
in FDIC v. Baldini, a district court recently observed that “there is
overwhelming authority to support the FDIC’s position that the business
judgment rule is highly fact dependent and, therefore, inappropriate for
consideration on a motion to dismiss.”112 But the court principally relied
on the Third Circuit’s decision in Stanziale v. Nachtomi (In re Tower

109.
110.

Id.
Maronda Homes, Inc. v. Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Ass’n,127 So. 3d
1258, 1268 (Fla. 2013).
111. 827 F. Supp. at 755.
112. 983 F. Supp. 2d 772, 783 (S.D. W. Va. 2013).
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Air, Inc.),113 to support its conclusion that the business judgment rule is a
fact-based defense.
Tower Air and other similar court decisions predate the Supreme
Court’s rulings in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly114 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,115 which “retired” the venerable “no set of facts” pleading
standard of Conley v. Gibson.116 The Supreme Court established a new
standard: plaintiffs could no longer ignore the substantive law that
governed their claim; to survive a motion to dismiss the plaintiff must
plead facts that plausibly suggest they are entitled to relief. The Court
stated that,
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
117
alleged.

The Court rejected the argument that groundless claims could be
“weeded out” early in discovery,118 and found that summary judgment
was not a viable alternative to the new pleading standards. Iqbal
confirmed the wide applicability of the Twombly pleading standard, and
clarified that (1) a court must only accept well-pled factual allegations;
and (2) must determine whether the claim for relief is plausible in light
of the court’s experience and common sense. Iqbal is particularly
instructive to advancing the business judgment rule at the motion to
dismiss stage because it concerned qualified immunity; the Court made
it clear that qualified immunity’s status as a “defense” did not alter the
Court’s reasoning.
Faced with the twin Supreme Court rulings in Twombly and Iqbal,
some courts have recognized that decisions such as the Third Circuit’s
ruling in Tower Air are now no longer good law and that the outcome of

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005).
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)).
118. Id. at 685 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)).

2015]

WHY DOES THE FDIC SUE BANK OFFICERS?

395

such motions depends on the underlying allegations.119 But other courts
have concluded that this defense cannot be resolved at the motion to
dismiss stage. Bank officer defendants should bear this in mind when
framing their motions to dismiss so that courts do not reflexively deny
their motions without testing them against these heightened pleading
standards.120 Any allegations that demonstrate that bank officers
followed a process when weighing the challenged decisions, availed
themselves of information, or made any inquiries are tailor-made to
establishing the exercise of business judgment. “Allegations amounting
to mere negligence, carelessness, or lackadaisical performance are
insufficient as a matter of law [to rebut the . . . rule].”121
But even if a court is unwilling to engage at the motion to dismiss,
officer defendants should not despair. Although they may have to
navigate a path through discovery, officer defendants are likely to have
an even more compelling argument at the summary judgment stage.
Assuming that defendants followed a reasonable process when making
decisions and did not put their own personal interests over those of the
institution, then the business judgment rule should end the case.
Undoubtedly, the FDIC and its experts will have a long litany of
mistakes and shortcomings in connection with the loan—typically
referred to as variances in lending parlance. But if the officer defendants
can demonstrate that they considered those variances when approving

119. See, e.g., Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 679 (N.D. Tex.
2011) (finding business judgment rule protections are substantive and independent of
the notice purpose of procedural rules of pleading); Data Key Partners v. Permira
Advisers LLC, 849 N.W.2d 693, 703 (Wis. 2014) (concluding, in light of Twombly, that
Tower Air suffers from “fatal flaws” and that plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to
avoid the business judgment rule, even when it is not raised on the face of the
complaint”).
120. Other defenses are beyond the scope of this article. These defenses include, but
are not limited to, statute of limitations, comparative or contributory negligence, failure
to mitigate, waiver, laches and estoppel. When directors and officers are sued by the
FDIC, or other federal agencies, the agencies often claim unique rules appropriate to
preserve the public interest. The Supreme Court in O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,
rejected the argument that national interests justified the creation of special common
law rules governing director and officer liability. 512 U.S. 79 (1994); see also FDIC v.
Skow, 741 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding no federal common law rule that
exempts the FDIC from defenses under state law). For a full discussion of these
additional matters, see John K. Villa, BANK DIRECTORS’, OFFICERS’, AND LAWYERS’
CIVIL LIABILITIES, (CCH Supp. 2014).
121. FDIC v. Blackwell, No. 1:11-CV-03423-RWS, 2012 WL 3230490, at *4 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 3, 2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
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the loan as part of the approval process, then that should suffice to
establish that the decision making process was rational and employed in
good faith.122
It was for that very reason that a district court in North Carolina
recently granted summary judgment to both directors and officers of a
failed bank.123 Rejecting the FDIC’s argument that the defendants had
deviated from prudent lending practices, the court noted that,
Under the business judgment rule, there can be no liability for
officers and directors even when a judge or jury considering the
matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong or
degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid,’ to ‘egregious’ or
‘irrational,’ so long as the court determines that the process
employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to
124
advance the corporate interests.

As the court explained,
Although the decisions of defendants to engage in various forms of
lending and to make the particular loans . . . raise interesting
discussion points in hindsight, the business judgment rule precludes
this Court from delving into whether or not the decisions were
‘good’ and limits the Court’s involvement to a determination of
whether the decisions were made in ‘good faith’ or were founded on
125
a ‘rational business purpose.

Nor does the fact that the lending decisions entailed risks constitute
irrationality.126 This opinion is a textbook illustration of the power of the
business judgment protection at the summary judgment stage. If
business judgment is to mean anything, it should protect directors and
officers who adhered to an established process from having to go to trial
to vindicate their process or decisions.
122. Sam Wong & Son Inc. v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 735 F.2d 653, 678 n.32 (2d
Cir. 1984) (Friendly, J.) (describing the rationality test as “a minimal requirement of
some basis in reason”); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (finding no liability for a decision the fact finder believes to be “wrong,”
“stupid,” or “egregious,” “so long as the [decision-making process] was either rational
or [was] employed in . . . good faith” (emphasis omitted)).
123. FDIC v. Willetts, No. 7:11-CV-165-BO, 2014 WL 4828330, at *6 (E.D.N.C.
Sept. 11, 2014). The FDIC has since filed an appealed with the Fourth Circuit.
124. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. at *5.
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CONCLUSION
FIRREA’s heightened liability standard poses the most significant
obstacle to the FDIC’s efforts to recover losses to the Deposit Insurance
Fund. After all, proving reckless or intentional conduct by former
directors and officers of failed banks is far more difficult than proving
ordinary negligence. That explains why the FDIC as receiver asserts
ordinary negligence claims whenever possible; it recognizes that those
claims pose a far greater risk to defendants than a case premised only on
gross negligence, and that defendants are far more vulnerable to those
claims if they cannot avail themselves of business judgment protections.
As we have seen, the law in many states (including Georgia, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Jersey, and Virginia) affords defendant officers complete
protection from ordinary negligence claims. In other states, such as
Florida, decisions are at odds and, therefore, give defense counsel room
to argue that the business judgment rule protects the good faith decisions
of their clients, even when the statutory codification of the rule speaks
only in terms of directors. In a handful of states, including California,
the prospect of insulating business judgments made by bank officers
from second-guessing is improbable. Officer defendants confronting
these claims in states that recognize the existence of business judgment
protections should focus their efforts on demonstrating the existence of a
standard, reasonable process underlying their decisions.

